Abstract: This paper explores the recent Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) judgments of El Kott and Bolbol, and the implications of those judgments on the interpretation and application of Article 1D. In the first part, I seek to give a brief overview of the purpose of Article 1D, as regards the Palestinian refugee population. I then go on to look at the interpretations adopted in the Bolbol and El Kott judgments of the CJEU. In the final part of this paper, I explore the difficulties of assessing indiscriminate violence in light of the CJEU judgments, by referring to the stance adopted by other international and national courts. In particular, I establish that requiring an individualisation of the risk goes against the purpose of Article 1D.
Directive 2011/95/EU. Whilst the recast Directive introduced some changes, they mostly related to the rights and benefits of refugees and those granted subsidiary protection, rather than addressing the granting of refugee status. As such, none are pertinent to the present analysis. The 2004 Directive contains language similar to the Convention, with Article 12(1)(a) of the Directive excluding from its scope any person coming within Article 1D of the Convention. It is after the adoption of the Directive that the Court of Justice of the European Union was given the opportunity to interpret, albeit indirectly, the wording of the Refugee Convention. This led to high expectations, as the Court's new competence was expected to lead to a harmonisation of asylum policy across Europe. 13 The nature of Article 1D has been the topic of debate. Article 1D is referred to as an "exclusion" clause in the UNHCR Handbook, as it excludes a certain population from the application of the Geneva Convention.
14 Takkenberg points out that the intention of the drafters was simply to exclude Palestinian Refugees temporarily, until a long-term solution was found. 15 He goes on to argue that the wording of the article leaves much to be desired in terms of clarity: "[i]t does not seem logical to include conditionally a whole category of refugees, similar to article 1a, paragraph 1, by way of an exception to an exclusion clause!" 16 Grahl-Madsen presents a similar argument, and takes the view that it is a suspensive, rather than exclusory, clause. 17 The view that Article 1D constitutes only a temporary exclusion clause is convincing. It is plainly reflected in the language of the provision. Whilst the first sentence has an exclusionary effect, the wording of the second sentence of Article 1D and its use of the phrase "ipso facto" suggests that it is in fact a temporary exclusion, as it provides for the inclusion of the concerned population, should the basis for the exclusion (receipt of protection and assistance from UN agencies) cease to exist. The final effect of the provision is that once the grounds for exclusion cease to exist the Convention is applicable to Palestinian refugees. In this way, it is a provision which aims to ensure the continuity of protection of Palestinian refugees, in accordance with the object and purpose of the Geneva Convention. It is meant to ensure that the concerned population benefits from heightened international protection. At the time of the drafting of the Convention, it was envisaged that Article 1D should serve as a temporary solution until a more durable one was found for 13 Palestinian refugees, as seen in the language used by the UN General Assembly, which envisaged that relief as provided by UN agencies should terminate no later than December
1950
. 18 Broader questions about the justifications for the creation of a separate refugee status have also been raised. Kagan in particular has questioned whether the Palestinian exceptionalism still has standing today. 19 He argues that the UN responsibility theory -the idea that the UN bears responsibility for the creation of the Palestinian refugee populationgreatly overstates the organisation's participation, which he identifies as being limited to the failure to provide peaceful resolution of a conflict. Combined with the expanding of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) mandate to resemble that of the UNHCR, he goes on to demonstrate how he considers the separate status for Palestinian refugees obsolete. Whilst an analysis of his argument is outside the scope of this paper, it provides a useful insight into the objections raised against the creation of Article 1D.
C. THE CJEU'S INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 1D
The interpretation of Article 1D has been centred around two points of particular importance.
The first issue is whether, once the protection and assistance mentioned in Article 1D has ceased, refugees should automatically benefit from protection under Article 1A(2) of the Convention, or whether they should have to meet additional requirements. The second point of contention is determining the conditions to be met in order for an Article 1D status to cease. Whilst the language used ("for any reason") suggests a broad approach to this question, the exact parameters are difficult to pinpoint. The recent Bolbol and El Kott judgments of the Court of Justice have shed some light on both questions.
Interpretation of "Ipso Facto" and Automatic Refugee Status
A key question, when looking at the application of Article 1D, is whether, once the grounds for exclusion mentioned in the provision cease to exist, refugee status is automatically obtained, along with the benefit of the rights contained in the Geneva Convention, or whether a person in question also needs to meet the additional requirements set out in Article 1A(2).
The requirements contained in the latter include a well-founded fear of persecution, for reasons of one of the five convention grounds (race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, political opinion), as well as being unwilling or unable to avail themselves of the protection of the country of residence. By creating a unique legal status, the drafters recognised the precarious and unique situation of Palestinian refugees. Inherent in such reasoning is the idea that Article 1A(2) is inadequate to their situation. In practice, they are unlikely to be successful in meeting such requirements. The very use of the phrase "ipso facto" in the language of Article 1D seems to indicate that refugee status should be acquired automatically upon cessation. Therefore, the prior recognition of Palestinian refugees as refugees by the international community seems to suggest there should be no additional requirements to be met. This interpretation of the provision was adopted by the UNHCR.
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In the case law prior to El Kott, the tendency of courts to balance this favourable reading of ipso facto with a restricted scope of Article 1D was apparent. This can be illustrated by reference to the El-Ali case from 2002, from the UK Court of Appeal. 21 In the judgment, the Court of Appeal confirms that the term "ipso facto" indicates that Palestinian refugees benefit from an automatic refugee status upon cessation of protection and assistance. 22 However, the Court of Appeal considered that this only applies to those who qualified as Palestinian refugees on or before the 28 th July 1951, at the time of signature of the Geneva Convention. The reasoning put forward to support this argument is that "so great a parcel of rights" 23 should not be granted without the category of recipients being precisely defined. Those who were not recognised as refugees at the time of drafting must have their applications examined individually, on a case-by-case basis, before they can be granted refugee status, provided they meet the criteria set out in Article 1A(2). Professor GoodwinGill, who made an intervention in this case on behalf of the UNHCR, convincingly argued that the Convention had a continuative effect thus encompassing those that had become refugees even after 1951. 24 Interpreting the Convention in any other way would lead to an artificial distinction, as identified by Takkenberg. 25 He also refers to a judgment of the Bolbol. In El Kott, the Court was once more asked whether the language of the Directive, which mentions in Article 11(1)(a) that a person is "entitled to the benefits of this Directive"
following cessation of protection and assistance, should be interpreted so as to mean that the applicants should benefit from refugee status under the 1951 Convention, from subsidiary protection under the Qualification Directive, or neither. The Court very clearly took the position that the phrase "benefits of the Directive", or, as phrased in the Geneva Convention, "benefits of this Convention", meant more than simply the possibility of applying for refugee status under Article 1A(2), as this was already an option. It goes on to consider that the second sentence of Article 1D would be "superfluous and ineffective" if its only purpose were to reiterate that persons who do not come within the exclusion clause may rely on the Convention itself. 27 Whilst the Court recognised that, once cessation had occurred, such a right to refugee status existed, it is not an unconditional right. Thus, the applicant will have to prove that he or she has sought protection and assistance from a United Nations agency, that cessation has occurred, and that none of the exclusion grounds, as set out in Article 1C, 1E
and 1F of the Geneva Convention, apply. These include situations where the applicant reavails him of herself of a new nationality, acquires a new nationality, when the applicant has committed a war crime, a serious non-political crime, or acted in a manner which goes against the principle and purposes of the United Nations. However, applicants will not be required to satisfy the requirements set out in Article 1A(2). The Court of Justice seems to have reached a balance between on the one hand, ensuring that Palestinian refugees benefit from equal, if not higher, international protection, and on the other hand, ensuring that the criteria are not so broad as to create an influx of Palestinian refugees into the European Union. The Court was deliberately careful with this very sensitive topic. 
Protection and Assistance
In order to benefit automatically from Convention refugee status, the applicant has to show that cessation of protection and assistance has occurred, and that they are thus no longer excluded from the application of the Geneva Convention under Article 1D.
a) Context in which assistance and protection is provided
Originally, two agencies were created for the purposes of providing the protection and assistance mentioned in Article 1D. the context of an asylum application, as it determines whether the applicant is concerned by the Article 1D exclusion.
b) Availment of protection and assistance
In its 2002 Note, the UNHCR underlined that not all Palestinian refugees are registered with UNRWA, and that therefore "the question whether a Palestinian is registered, or is eligible to be registered, with UNRWA will need to be determined individually". 41 By this statement, the UNHCR acknowledges the difficulties of registration with UNRWA, and recognises that there are refugees who are unable to register. However, it has since changed its position. In asylum application, and that she should ipso facto benefit from the Convention. Whilst she had not actually availed herself of such protection and assistance, she was entitled to receive it. Furthermore, she claimed cessation had occurred when she left the UNRWA zone of operation in the Gaza Strip, which she claimed was unsafe due to the general climate of violence caused by tensions between Fatah and Hamas. 44 Three questions were referred to the CJEU. The first was whether the applicant must have availed themselves of the protection and assistance of the agency in order to come under the Article 1D status, or whether it is sufficient simply to be entitled to such protection and assistance. Secondly, the court asked which conditions had to be met in order for cessation to occur and thus bring about the application of the second paragraph of Article 1D. Finally, the court asked whether, once cessation has been proven, the applicant is fully recognised as a refugee, and thus can enjoy the rights contained in the Convention, or whether the additional criteria in 1A(2) also have to be met. In answering the first question, the CJEU found that, in order to come within the ambit of Article 1D, one has to avail themselves of protection and assistance. Simple registration is not sufficient. Therefore, different levels of protection will be granted to Palestinian refugees whether they are living in an UNRWA area, registered with UNRWA, or whether they have availed themselves of protection and assistance. This can be criticised in the sense that the drafters did not intend such distinctions to be made. It is argued that the aim of Article 1D
was to provide for a particular refugee population, not create a protection gap for the most vulnerable members of that population; namely those not receiving assistance from the UN.
Furthermore, lack of availment of protection and assistance should not be sufficient to exclude Palestinian refugees from UNRWA's mandate. 50 Takkenberg also takes the opposite view to the Advocate General's and suggests that the debate should not be centred around whether the person is receiving protection and assistance but around their status of registration, and whether it is possible for them to receive assistance. 51 This would include refugees who reside within the geographical zone covered by UNWRA, but have not availed themselves of its protection or assistance.
Qafisheh and Azarov take a similar approach, and argue that a correct interpretation of Article 1D would be to find that there is no requirement to prove that protection and assistance were received. 52 Upholding such a requirement would unjustly differentiate between members of the refugee population, thus not ensuring the continuity of protection, which is a concept central to the object and purpose of the Geneva Convention. The UNHCR, in its Note on the Interpretation of Article 1D, adopted the same view. 53 The Note points out the purpose of Article 1D, which is twofold: to avoid any overlap between competencies, and to ensure the continuity of protection and assistance which is provided to Palestinian should not be restricted to those registered with UNRWA. Such a discriminatory interpretation and application of the Geneva Convention does not seem compatible with the overall aims of the Convention.
c) Cessation of protection and assistance
Article 1D was set up as an exclusion, albeit temporary, to refugee status. Therefore, pinpointing cessation will help to identify whether one is concerned by the suspension clause or not. Secondly, Article 1D is meant to ensure heightened international protection for Palestinian refugees, and aims to recognise refugees as exercising agency, not simply being passive subjects. Recognising that voluntary departure may lead to cessation of the exclusion ground would certainly be compatible with such aim. Finally, they mention that a restrictive interpretation would place an excessive burden of proof on the applicant, something which goes against the idea of international protection promoted by the Convention. Whilst these arguments are convincing, they seem to revolve around the general object and intent of the Convention. However, the Geneva Convention, as mentioned above, has had to adapt in light of an ever-changing international context, and it is thus difficult to continuously rely on the intention of the drafters. Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that states will go as far as recognising that any Palestinian refugee can benefit from the Convention, following their voluntary departure from the UNRWA zone of operations. They are reluctant to do this, as it would amount to an invitation for the Palestinian refugee populations to seek asylum in their 56 Takkenberg (n 15) 107. 57 Bolbol, Opinion of AG Sharpston (n 47) para 79. 58 Qafisheh and Azarov (n 33) 561.
territory. Finally, recognising refugees as exercising agency does not fit in with states' view of refugee law, which remains State-centric and is built on an outdated notion of refugees not exercising agency.
Many states look to the concept of returnability in identifying cessation, as has been done by courts in Finland, 59 as well as legislation in the Netherlands. 60 The idea is to look at whether there is a possibility for the applicant to return to the place of origin. If such a possibility exists, then cessation will not have occurred, and Article 1D will still apply. On the other hand, if there is no possibility of return and the refugee has not left of his own accord, then cessation will be deemed to have occurred. Takkenberg has also argued that the term "for any reason" does not include a voluntary departure of UNRWA's area of operations. 61 Similarly to the concept of returnability, he recognises that cessation may occur where refugees are outside of the UNWRA mandated zone, only if they cannot return to the territory of habitual residence. This could be the case when there is no possibility of return, or where the applicant refuses to return because of a danger or threat to him. The UNHCR Revised Statement also sheds some light on this approach to the concept of returnability;
situations falling into this scenario include: where the applicant is unable to return, for instance where the authorities will not let him into the territory, will not renew travel documents; or where the applicant is unwilling to return due to a threat to his or her physical safety or freedom.
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This position echoes the view that was taken by the CJEU in the El Kott case, the facts of which were as follows: three Palestinian men, who resided in refugee camps run by UNRWA in Lebanon, were forced to flee following threats to their safety. Upon arrival in Hungary, they applied for refugee status, which was not granted to them. They appealed the decision, and the national court referred the matter to the CJEU in the context of the operations. It went on to identify three situations where cessation could occur. They are:
where the agency ceases to exist, where the agency is unable to fulfil its mandate, or where the person had to leave the zone of operation for reasons beyond their control. 64 Therefore, the judgment does show a willingness to recognise that cessation "for any reason" may include leaving the zone of UNRWA operations, if this is done for reasons beyond a person's will or control. The Court suggests it is willing to recognise cessation, if the refugee can show that his or her "personal safety is at serious risk" and it is "impossible for the agency to guarantee his living conditions." 65 The Court ultimately leaves it up to the host state to carry out an assessment of risk, and consider whether risk in the refugee camp is sufficient for the decision to leave to be considered independent of any volition. The national courts will have to assess, on a case-by-case basis, first whether a sufficient threat exists to the applicant's safety, and secondly whether UNRWA is unable to guarantee living conditions, in line with its mandate. This position and wording broadly reflects that of the UNHCR, who in the Note on the Interpretation of Article 1D identified two main instances of cessation: "threats to life, security, freedom or other protection related reasons", and "practical, legal and safety barriers to return". 66 The Court has set a low threshold, and developed a test centred around the personal safety of refugees, which is appreciable. However, the effect of the judgment will boil down to how national courts carry out the assessment. It will highlight the difficulties that courts face in appreciating a situation of general risk, and in carrying out an impartial assessment.
D. POST-EL KOTT ASSESSMENT OF RISK IN REFUGEE CAMPS BY NATIONAL COURTS
As argued above, the outcome of the El Kott judgment is that Palestinian refugees will be able to prove cessation if they cannot return to their country of habitual residence due to reasons beyond their control, and if the organ or agency mandated to provide them with protection cannot guarantee their living conditions. Whilst national courts have often come to assess risk when considering refugee claims based on Article 1A(2) of the Geneva Convention, it is a specific assessment in light of the individual circumstances of the claimant, rather than a general appreciation of the situation in the country or origin.
Therefore, in the context of a post-El Kott refugee application, an applicant for refugee status in the European Union, having proven that he or she has received protection and assistance from UNRWA, will see the court scrutinise the threat to life and personal safety in the context of the widespread violence. Assessing indiscriminate violence is a difficult task for courts. It is complicated to appreciate how indiscriminate the level of violence is.
Furthermore, reliable information sources in zones of such conflict must be found. Whilst statistics may be useful, it is difficult to appreciate the situation based solely on numbers.
In In this case, the Federal Administrative Court carried out a very detailed analysis to assess the risk in the country of origin. In the judgment, it is apparent that the Court relied on statistics to make the decision, coming to the conclusion that there was a 0.12% chance of the applicant being injured or killed by a terrorist attack in the Nineveh Province. 74 It also identified the "high level of indiscriminate violence" required in order to meet the conditions of subsidiary protection. This highly detailed quantitative analysis seems unbecoming in the context of an appreciation of generalised violence. It bypasses other key factors that cannot be translated into statistics, such as severity of injuries, whether the violence is widespread or localised, and the availability of medical care. The UK Upper tribunal has taken a different approach, and held in a case from 2010 that "evidence cannot be confined to the numbers of casualties", 75 although appreciating that statistics may "furnish a part of the overall evidence needed to assess 15(c)".
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In another German case, the Court found that in the situation where the applicant would face a serious and individual threat "solely on account of his presence on the territory of that country or region", 77 this would amount to a situation of internal conflict under the meaning of Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive, which is to be interpreted in light of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II. 78 Whilst there is no definition of internal conflict in the Geneva Conventions, the Additional Protocol II, which applies in noninternational armed conflict, suggests that it is more than simply "situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence" 79 . high threshold of violence is required. Although the German Court's attempt at finding objective standards against which risk can be measured, be it statistics or norms of international law, can be useful, it sets a high threshold for applicants, and is insufficient in its focus on protection of the individual. The Czech Republic has also adopted this approach, and has considered that a conflict which satisfies the standard of internal armed conflict, as set out by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), in the Tadič case 80 could be an internal conflict for the purposes of Article 15(c). 81 The Tadič should not be construed to cover "purely criminal" 84 or "non-military" 85 violence.
Whilst it is appreciable to have an objective recognised standard of the threshold of violence required, international humanitarian law should be used carefully in the context of subsidiary protection. It must be highlighted that the purpose of international humanitarian law is to ensure the protection of civilians in a situation of conflict. Refugee law applies to persons who find themselves in a very different situation, as they are no longer within the conflict zone. Furthermore, humanitarian law seeks to apply to the parties to the conflict, in The divergent approaches taken in these cases raise questions about the need for a fixed standard of violence. Adopting a restrictive interpretation of international and internal armed conflict, based on existing international norms, it is submitted, also creates the possibility of another protection gap emerging. Whilst using humanitarian law in the context of risk assessments can be seen as an opportunity to have a more consistent application of the Directive, by ensuring an objective standard exists, it should be limited to informing the assessment, and not setting a fixed standard. This would have the consequence of restricting the scope of application of the measure.
ii) The individualisation of risk:
The required. 90 The judgment specifies that "indiscriminate violence" is indiscriminate in that it goes beyond people's personal circumstances. However, the "serious and individual threat" to be shown by the applicant implies that the risk is higher than it would be for the average his presence on the territory of that country or region, face a real risk of being subject to the serious threat referred in article 15(c) of the Directive" 91 , then there is no need to show distinguishing features proving such a threat. However, when the situation is not one of total conflict, such features must be shown, in order to establish that the applicant is targeted.
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Regarding the individualisation of the risk, as required following Elgafaji, national courts have interpreted the judgment in varying ways. For instance, the Swedish Migration
Board held that the applicant had to be "personally at risk", due to "particular circumstances". 93 German courts have interpreted the individual risk requirement to mean that the applicant must simply be at a "greater risk" than the general population, due to distinguishing features -such as exercising certain professions, or having particular religious or ethnic affiliations. 94 The different wording used shows the nuanced ways in which the CJEU's judgment may be applied to facts. Hathaway strongly criticises the idea that any appreciation of risk should be individualised: "to require a singling out confuses the requirement to assess risk on the basis of the applicant's particular circumstances with some erroneous notion that refugee status must be based on a completely personalised set of facts." 95 Errera also suggests that the task ahead for national courts is to focus on risky situations, rather than personal experiences. 96 McAdam suggests that we should focus on whether there is a reasonable chance that the applicant will suffer serious harm, rather than linger on the interpretation of the word "individual", 97 as used in the Qualification Directive.
McAdam further highlights the difficulties which are presented by Article 15(c), and concludes that inconsistent application by national courts has led to legal uncertainty regarding Article 15(c). This inconsistent interpretation and application of the case law amongst Member States will necessarily come at a disadvantage for applicants, who will have no certainty as to which test will be applied. She argues that, in placing too much emphasis on the notion of "individual" risk, there is a risk that the burden on the applicant will become too great, thus rendering subsidiary protection ineffective as a complementary mechanism of protection.
Elgafaji has provided some much-needed clarification to national courts on Article In order to appreciate the situation, the ECtHR looks at the "general situation", as well as the situation of different regions where the applicants could be expected to relocate. 103 The judgment identifies a yardstick, which includes assessing the methods of warfare used, whether they increase the possibility of civilian casualties, the extent to which such methods of warfare are used, and the location of the fighting, whether it is widespread or confined to one area. 104 The Court also distinguishes between on the one hand, a "dire humanitarian situation" which is attributable to poverty and general lack of resources, and on the other a humanitarian crisis caused by the actions of the parties to the conflict. 105 There is extensive description of the situation, and the ECtHR draws on reports from a wide range of sources, including reports from the UK and the US. Whilst the decision is also based on UN reports and estimates, the court does provide for a margin of error in these numbers. 106 The Court also stated that, in carrying out an assessment of the situation in the country of origin, national courts may take into account the geographic extent of the conflict, and the destination of return for the applicant. However, for the purposes of the Palestinian refugees, that is of limited concern, as they will often lack the documentation to go anywhere but the UNRWA zones, for which there is precise delimitation.
The ECtHR's detailed assessment -in particular the variety of information used and the range of sources referred to -is useful and instructive, whilst providing for inaccuracy and human error. Whilst national courts have used a variety of sources, their approach remains heterogeneous. In this context, the ECtHR assessment may prove useful in the context of risk assessments with regard to situations of indiscriminate violence. The approach of the ECtHR is balanced, informed and pragmatic, qualities that are not found in the CJEU judgements regarding Article 1D, which remain vague and do not delve into the intricacies of carrying out risk assessments.
Level of Violence in UNRWA Refugee Camps
In applying the El Kott test to Palestinian Refugees, courts will have to assess whether cessation of protection and assistance from UNWRA has occurred for reasons beyond the control of the individual. In other words, courts will have to assess whether the situations in UNWRA zones and refugee camps amount to the standard of violence set out by the CJEU.
Refugee camps face constant problems of gender-based violence. A UNHCR Report on gender based-violence highlights the danger faced by women and girls in their everyday lives. 107 The report holds the causes to be the corruption of guards and patrol officers within the camps, as well as the disruption of social structures due to the constant flow of arrivals.
Such arrivals make it difficult to establish and maintain order in the camps. Refugee Camps are also directly affected by the regional political climate. For instance, the Palestinian Refugee Camps in Lebanon are dreading renewed violence as tensions between Hamas and Hezbollah are rising. 108 In the case of Sufi and Elmi, as mentioned above, the European Court of Human Rights explicitly recognises the dangerous situation of certain refugee and Internally
Displaced Persons camps, such as those in the Afgooye Corridor, or the Dadaab camps in Kenya. 109 The Court goes on to consider that should the applicant be sent back there, "there would be a real risk that he would be exposed to treatment in breach of Article 3 on account of the humanitarian conditions there". 110 In assessing situations, the judgment points to factors such as nutrition, hygiene, shelter, violence and the expected duration of the situation.
In other words, the ECtHR has no difficulty in recognising that the situation of certain refugee camps is particularly violent.
The precarious and unstable situation of refugee populations is conducive to outbursts of generalised violence, a recurring problem in refugee camps. Militarisation and genderbased violence in particular are of significant concern to the international community. 111 Therefore, we can be relatively certain that the situation in Palestinian refugee camps, if correctly assessed by national courts, has the potential to satisfy the El Kott requirement of violence. However, that it will satisfy the upper end of the scale, a level of such violence that one's presence constitutes a sufficient threat, is far from being a given. Therefore, if national courts uphold a requirement of distinguishing features, it will constitute yet another hurdle for Palestinian refugees' asylum applications, bringing it closer to the requirements set out in Article 1(A)(2), and therefore denying them of the protection the drafters intended them to receive.
E. CONCLUSION
The CJEU's recent standpoint on the interpretation of Article 1D has allowed for the possibility of a harmonisation of the asylum policy regarding Palestinian Refugees. In Bolbol,
the Court held that, in order to come under the second paragraph of Article 1D, refugees had to avail themselves of UNRWA aid. In El Kott, the Court confirmed that, once cessation had been proven, refugees would automatically benefit from the Convention status, without having to satisfy further requirements. The El Kott judgment also recognised that nonreturnability to the UNRWA zone of operations could be recognised where there is a serious threat to the applicant's life.
Yet, the high hopes that were vested in the CJEU's opportunity to review the application of the Geneva Convention were not completely fulfilled. Whilst the CJEU in El Kott makes it clear that, where the applicant's personal safety is at risk, he or she should automatically benefit from refugee status under the Convention, it has given little guidance to national courts in terms of how to carry out an assessment of the situation in refugee camps.
It may have done this purposely, to allow them a certain leeway. Member States are conscious of the fact that recognising a general climate of violence, without such a requirement for individual risk, would amount to prima facie refugee recognition, therefore creating an incentive for a huge number of refugees to seek asylum in their territory. This may lead, as it has in the context of subsidiary protection, to inconsistent refugee recognition across different Member States. In order to achieve consistent refugee recognition, it is vital that the CJEU give adequate guidance to the Member States.
There are several other lessons that we can learn from the case law that has developed regarding assessment of generalised violence by the CJEU. In the assessment of the general risk in refugee camps, a notion of indiscriminate violence, informed by international humanitarian law, and using standards such as the one set out in Tadič, would best serve the interests of the Palestinian Refugee population. However, whilst these norms should inform the risk assessment as carried out by the Court, they should not be taken as a fixed benchmark, as this would result in a protection gap, as argued.
The statement from European states during the drafting of the Geneva Convention, which highlights their reluctance to "bind themselves to a text under which their obligations would be extended to include a new, large group of refugees" 112 is still true today. This is why the CJEU's activism is crucial, in order for the Geneva Convention to be consistently applied, in accordance with its purpose and object. It remains to be seen whether the CJEU judgments will have weight outside of the EU. The wording of Article 1D and that used in the Qualification Directive being almost identical, it is likely that it will have a bearing on other jurisdictions' interpretation of this provision.
